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I. INTRODUCTION 
What is the difference between the substantial form, the essence, 
and the soul of a living material substance? Each of these three items 
would normally be considered in a course in Thomistic philosophy. In 
my experience, there reaches a point where students begin to wonder 
how these terms are related and even whether it is necessary to de-
scribe the metaphysical principles of things in so many different ways. I 
have found it useful, for my own understanding and my teaching, to 
exploit, even to foster, some potential confusions precisely in order to 
focus on them, and in the process illuminate certain distinctions and 
insights in Thomistic philosophy. 
II. CONFUSIONS 
Presentations of Thomistic metaphysics can tend to present the 
substantial form, essence, and soul as if they are basically the same 
thing. Aquinas himself, after all, sometimes treats "form" as syn-
onymous with "essence,"1 and they seem to serve the same basic 
metaphysical task: both are causes not only of a thing's being the kind 
of thing it is, but of its just being.2 And, as causes, the causality 
exercised by both the essence and the form is formal, not material or 
efficient.3 As for the soul, Aquinas of course adopts its Aristotelian 
1 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 1: "Dicitur etiam forma secundum quod per 
formam significatur certitudo uniuscuiusque rei, ut <licit Avicenna in II 
Metaphysicae suae." 
2 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. 1: "Et hoc est quod Philosophus frequenter 
nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod aliquid habet esse quid." De 
Principiis Naturae, ch. 1: "omne a quo aliquid habet esse, quodcumque esse sit 
sive substantiale, sive accidentale, potest dici forma." 
3 D.Q. Mcinerny treats essence and substantial form as the same in his 
Metaphysics (Priestly Fraternity of St. Peter, 2004), 219-20, 237. 
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definition as the form of (a certain kind oO a body, i.e. as that kind of 
body's substantial form. He even says, on at least one occasion, that the 
soul can be called the essence (or the quod quid erat esse) of the body.1 
So, surely, one might be forgiven for beginning to treat "essence," 
"substantial form," and "soul" as different words for the same 
metaphysical principle. The words may not be synonymous, but per-
haps they are co-extensional, picking out the same item but in virtue of 
different connotations: we talk about a substantial form when we want 
to emphasize the natural philosopher's contrast between form and 
matter; of essence when we want to emphasize the common whatness or 
quiddity of something, or else when we want to talk about the famed 
Thomistic real distinction between esse and essentia in created beings; 
and we speak of the soul when we are considering living things as living 
things-explaining either their various powers as living things or their 
very life itself. 
On the other hand, it is not very difficult to show that these three 
cannot be identified, that as metaphysical principles they play different 
roles that should not be confused. For consider the following meta-
physical equations, each describing in different ways the com-
positionality5 of an individual living material substance, such as 
Socrates, and each well attested in the works of Aquinas: 
(1) Socrates is a composite of a substantial form and prime matter. 
(2) Socrates is a composite of an essence and some designated 
matter. 
4 Aquinas, In Metaph. Bk. 7, lect. 10 (§1484): "Corpus enim organicum non potest 
definiri nisi per animam. Et secundum hoc anima dicitur quod quid erat esse tali 
corpori." 
5 Note that these "compositions" are not to be thought of as the mixing 
together of material elements, or the incidental joining of components that 
have independent existence in their own right. A consistent emphasis in 
Aquinas is that a material substance, like Socrates, is really one substance, 
and so when we speak of Socrates as a composite we are distinguishing in 
him metaphysical principles which are "parts" of Socrates in the sense that 
they are not identical with Socrates and they are not beings in their own 
right, but taken in combination they can be said to constitute the really one 
substantial whole. 
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(3) Socrates is a composite of a soul and a body. 
Now, given the metaphysical equations listed here, it should be 
quite clear that in referring to Socrates' substantial form, soul, and 
essence we are not referring to exactly the same things. For each of 
these is said to constitute Socrates together with respective, comp-
lementary, metaphysical principles that are not identical with each 
other: prime matter, which is matter in pure potentiality, lacking any 
actuality, is not the same as designated matter, which is matter with 
some actuality, namely that actuality which determines it to particular 
dimensions; and neither prime matter nor designated matter is the 
same as the relevant body which is composed with the soul; for that 
body is not prime matter, and it has even more actuality than 
designated matter, enough actuality to make it "an organized body 
having life potentially in it." But then, if prime matter, designated 
matter, and an organized body capable of life are clearly distinct, then 
the three principles with which they respectively compose the same 
one substance cannot be identical. 
III. FURTHER CONFUSIONS 
One proposal for making sense of a difference between essence and 
substantial form would describe the essence as universal or specific and 
the substantial form as individual or particular. But will this do? The 
essence or nature or quiddity, considered absolutely or according to its 
proper ratio, abstracts from existence in particular individuals (but this 
also is not the universal, as Aquinas famously makes clear in De Ente et 
Essentia, ch. 4). The essence or nature or quiddity can also be considered 
insofar as it has being in individuals, but in this case it is multiplied-the 
quiddity as it has esse in Socrates is only specifically the same, but 
remains numerically distinct, from the quiddity as it has esse in Plato. 
(This is why it sometimes seems appropriate to speak of "individual" 
essences or "individualized" essences, or singular or particular 
essences, although this is controversial.6) Likewise, substantial forms 
can be spoken of as numerically distinct actualities in individual things; 
but by abstracting from their individual determinations in individual 
things, we can speak of a common form-e.g. the substantial form of 
6 Cf. Joshua P. Hochschild, "Kenny and Aquinas on Individual Essences," 
Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 6 (2006): 45-56. 
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man common to Socrates and Plato and all other human beings-as 
specifically one, that is, in a sense as "universal." So it does not seem 
that we can distinguish essence and substantial form just as universal 
vs. particular. 
Nor can we distinguish form from essence simply by availing 
ourselves of Aquinas's point that essence includes both form and 
matter.7 After all, Aquinas says essence only includes "undesignated" or 
"common" matter. Designated or determinate matter is the principle of 
individuation; the undesignated "matter" that we are including in the 
essence-because it is formulated as part of the definition of the thing-
is, as part of the essence, occupying the role of a formal principle.8 The 
essence of man "includes matter" only insofar as we can't define man 
except as a kind of material thing; but then, doesn't materiality enter 
into the essence of man formally, as a part of the determination of the 
kind of thing a man is?9 It seems that, proceeding up the Porphyrian 
tree, we simply spell out that man is a rational, sensitive, living, 
material substance. But if this is what is meant by the "universal" or 
"common" matter that is included in the essence of man "along with" 
the form, it is hard to see how this matter adds anything to the form. 
Especially given the thesis of the unicity of the substantial form, the 
form by which something is a material substance, made up of some 
kind of matter, must be that very form by which the material substance 
is the specific kind of material substance it is. If this is all that is meant 
7 The claim is sustained throughout Aquinas's career. See e.g. De Ente et Essentia, 
ch. 2 and Summa Theologiae I, q. 75, a. 4; the claim will be discussed further 
below. 
8 In the words of Fr. John Wippel, the essence is "the formal part" of that of 
which it is the essence. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas 
(Washington, D. C.: the Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 205. 
9 Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Sheed and Ward, 
1935), 211, n. 3 (continued to 212): "This unindividuated or common matter 
[included in the essence of man], taken simply as receiving the form and 
determined by it, and not as the primary root of certain characters (the 
individual characters) of the subject, is made known to us by the form: 
materia cognoscitur per formam, a qua sumitur ratio universalis (St. Thomas, loc 
cit. [In VII Metaph., lect. 10] Cf. De Verit., q. 10, 1, 4 & 5), and is part of that 
which we have here termed the immaterialized being (archetypal being) or 
formal being of the thing (forma totius, seu potius forma quae est totum)." 
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by affirming that an essence of a material being "includes matter," it is 
hard to see how essence and substantial form differ at all. 
As for the difference between substantial form and soul, this too 
seems problematic. As a good Aristotelian, Aquinas frequently invites 
us to identify the soul of a living material substance with its substantial 
form. But if we identify them with each other, why do we say that 
Socrates is composed of soul and body? Perhaps someone would argue 
that we should instead say that Socrates is composed of his soul and 
prime matter? After all, in calling the soul substantial form, Aquinas says 
that it is the form of the body. To say that does not imply that the soul 
is composed with the body; the soul as substantial form of the body 
could be composed with prime matter, thus producing the body of 
which it is the form. Given that such a body obviously must have a 
substantial form by virtue of which it is a body, and again, given the 
thesis of the uni city of substantial forms, this substantial form by which 
the body is a body must be the soul that has already been identified as 
its substantial form. 10 So, in referring to the body of which the soul is 
the form, we are referring to something that has that relevant form.11 It 
is like when we refer to such-and-such a shape as the form of the statue. 
The statue is a statue because of the form, and we don't say that it is 
composed of form and statue; we say it is composed of form and, say, 
bronze. 
But this line of argument is inadequate. Because, if we attend to 
what Aquinas says about soul and body, we have to admit that in 
addition to saying that the soul is the form of the body, he does say, 
quite clearly, that the individual living substance is composed of soul and 
body, as a whole is made from distinct parts. In De Ente et Essentia for 
instance, he says: "Man is said to be [composed] from soul and body, as 
10 Aquinas, Quest. de Anima, q. 9: "since a soul is a substantial form because it 
constitutes a human being in a determinate species of substance, there is no 
other substantial form intermediate between a soul and prime matter; but it 
is the soul itself which perfects a human being according to diverse levels of 
perfection, so that he is a body, and a living body, and a rational animal." Cf. 
Summa Theologiae l, q. 76 ad. 4. 
11 Frederick C. Copleston, Aquinas (Penguin, 1955), 155: " ... to call the soul the 
form of the body is to say that the soul is what makes the body a human 
body." 
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from two things some third thing is constituted which is neither of those 
[two]; for a man is neither soul nor body."12 
IV. CLARIFICATIONS 
To address the puzzle of how to understand the difference between 
substantial form, soul, and essence, I will proceed by considering each 
of these principles in their own right. 
1. Socrates = substantial form + prime matter 
The language of form comes from the context of natural philosophy 
and the analysis of change. Change involves matter-an underlying 
subject-receiving form. And because all physical things come to be, 
that is, are a result of change, each can be conceived as a composite of 
matter and form. Form is that by which something has being; it is the 
principle of actuality. What it actualizes, the principle of potentiality, is 
matter. In the case of accidental change, the form is an accidental form 
and what receives it or is actualized by it is something that already has 
some substantial being: it is a substance. In the case of substantial 
change, the underlying subject or matter that receives the form cannot 
already be a substance. In De Principiis Naturae, Aquinas first introduces 
that which is in potency to substantial being as matter from which, as 
opposed to matter of which-then simply as matter in its proper sense, 
as opposed to the looser sense of matter that includes the subject that 
is in potency to accidental being. Eventually, he introduces the notion 
of prime matter, that which is only in potency to being without any 
actuality of its own; only this can be the subject of the substantial form 
by which the individual substance comes to be. So, an individual 
material substance is said to be composed of substantial form and 
prime matter. Since the substantial form is the principle of all grades of 
actuality of the composite, the other, material, principle that it informs 
in itself has no actuality; it only has potency. That is why the material 
substance is said to be composed of substantial form and prime matter. 
12 Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia, ch. Z: "ex anima enim et corpore dicitur esse 
homo sicut ex duabus rebus quaedam res tertia constituta quae neutra 
illarum est, homo enim neque est anima neque corpus." Cf. Summa Contra 
Gentiles II, 69: "Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae actu 
existentes, sed ex eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens." 
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Notice, however, that there are different ways of signifying what 
something is, according to the different grades of actuality for which 
the substantial form is responsible. Socrates is a man, and he is an 
animal, and he is a body. In each case here, the predicates-"man," 
"animal," "body"-are substantial predicates; they speak of what Soc-
rates is essentially, but with greater or lesser specificity. Indeed, we can 
even name the grades of actuality that these terms signify in Socrates-
his humanity, his animality, his corporeity. We could even speak of 
each of these as distinct forms, but the distinction between them is 
merely rational, not real. That is the point of the thesis of the unicity of 
substantial forms already mentioned: there is not a plurality of 
substantial forms in a substance, one for each grade of substantial 
actuality; rather, the one substantial form of the substance com-
municates all grades of substantial actuality. So, while in ratio 
corporeity, animality, and humanity all differ, they are in reality all the 
same one substantial form, only conceived in different respects. 
2. Socrates = soul + body 
We speak of a soul in the context of that part of natural philosophy 
that seeks to account for why some material things are alive and have 
certain vital functions. In a pre-philosophical sense, the soul is the 
principle of life, whatever that may be. The philosopher seeks an 
analysis of what kind of thing or principle the soul is. 
Now, by speaking of life, we are logically isolating one grade of 
actuality, the vital perfections of the living material substance, from 
other grades of actuality, like its materiality. But this grade of actuality 
is a substantial actuality, which is why the Aristotelian philosopher is 
so keen to identify the soul with the substantial form. The soul is the 
substantial form named insofar as that form is the principle of life; but 
then it differs only rationally and not really from that substantial form 
by virtue of which the living body is a body. 
Thus, Aquinas can even say that a living substance's bodiliness or 
corporiety is its soul,13 insofar as both name the one substantial form by 
13 Aquinas, Quaestiones disputate de Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 3 ad 14: "Corpus 
autem quod est in genere substantiae, habet formam substantialem quae 
dicitur corporeitas, quae non est tres dimensiones, sed quaecumque forma 
substantialis ex qua sequuntur in materia tres dimensiones; et haec forma in 
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virtue of which the living material substance is a living material 
substance. 
This must be the sense of bodiliness signified by "body" when we 
say that the soul is the form of the body. For, as we saw above, when we 
say that the soul is the form of the body, the body we are talking about 
is the genus of the being of which the soul is the soul.14 In everyday 
terms, in this sense, Socrates is the body. 
But we also speak of a body that Socrates has. In this sense, the body 
of Socrates is not his genus, but his part. True, this part of him is what 
it is thanks to the same one substantial form of Socrates; but it is 
referred to as a part insofar as it can be conceived of not only apart 
from, but in a sense excluding, the further perfections-life, rationality, 
etc.-that make Socrates the kind of thing he is. Recognizing this-for 
there is the same ambiguity in Latin between the corpus that Socrates is 
and the corpus that he has-Aquinas described two different senses of 
igne est igneitas, in animali anima sensitiva, et in homine anima intellectiva." 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. IV, ch. 81: "Non enim sunt diversae formae 
substantiales in uno et eodem, per quarum unam collocetur in genere 
supremo, puta substantiae; et per aliam in genere proximo, puta in genere 
corporis vel animalis; et per aliam in specie puta hominis aut equi. Quia si 
prima forma faceret esse substantiam, sequentes formae iam advenirent ei 
quod est hoc aliquid in actu et subsistens in natura: et sic posteriores formae 
non facerent hoc aliquid, sed essent in subiecto quod est hoc aliquid sicut 
formae accidentales. Oportet igitur, quod corporeitas, prout est forma 
substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima rationalis, quae in sua 
materia hoc requirit, quod habeat tres dimensiones: est enim actus corporis 
alicuius." Cf. Compendium Theologiae, Bk. I, ch. 154. 
14 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 76, a. 4 ad I: "Aristotle does not say that the 
soul is the act of a body only, but 'the act of a physical organic body which 
has life potentially'; and that this potentiality 'does not reject the soul.' 
Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act [of the body], the soul 
itself is included [in the body]; as when we say that heat is the act of what is 
hot, and light [is the act] of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were 
two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In like 
manner, the soul is said to be the 'act of a body,' etc., because by the soul it is 
a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in 
potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality 
'does not reject'-that is, does not exclude-the soul." 
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"body." One is an exclusive sense, which names the body Socrates has 
(body as a part) and the other a non-exclusive sense, which names the 
body Socrates is (body as a whole). 
Corresponding with this, we can distinguish exclusive and non-
exclusive senses of "soul." The non-exclusive sense indicates the 
substantial form as principle of life, but not excluding other 
perfections, including corporeity, communicated by the form; these 
other perfections then do not have to be added to it, for they are 
virtually or implicitly included. The exclusive sense of "soul" indicates 
the substantial form exclusively as principle of life, leaving outside of 
its meaning the perfection of corporeity, which therefore has to be 
considered as something added. 
This helps us make sense of how we can say that Socrates' soul is his 
substantial form, and also that his soul is composed with body and not 
prime matter. Socrates' soul is his substantial form, but when I refer to 
it as his substantial form, I am implying every grade of actuality, and its 
complementary metaphysical principle is prime matter-this is "soul" 
in the non-exclusive sense. When I refer to Socrates' soul as a part of 
him, which constitutes the whole together with his body, I am implying 
only the grade of actuality of life in the exclusive sense, and so distinct 
from the bodiliness, in the exclusive sense, by virtue of which he has a 
body. Of course that body is a body by virtue of the same substantial 
form by which it is alive. But the soul considered in its exclusive sense 
differs from the substantial form as one grade of actuality to the full 
grade of actuality communicated by that form. 15 
15 The position sketched here is explored in much greater detail in Gyula 
Klima, "Man = Body + Soul: Aquinas's Arithmetic of Human Nature," in Brian 
Davies, ed., Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 257-73. [Also available online at: http://www. 
fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/ BODYSOUL.HTM.] Incidentally, Klima's 
distinction of different ways of signifying the one substantial form by which 
a living body is a body and alive solves the difficulties raised in the last 
section of another article in Davies' anthology, Christopher Hughes, "Matter 
and Actuality in Aquinas," 61-76. 
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3. Socrates= essence+ designated matter 
In what context do we speak of essences? In the sense used by 
Aquinas, essentia pertains to answering the question of what something 
is (and hence it is paired with esse which answers to the question of 
whether something is or that by which it is); it is what is captured by a 
definition. (It is also called quiddity, and more typically corresponds to 
the Greek to ti ein einai than ousia.) And it is also called nature, or 
common nature. 
It is true that Aquinas will loosely refer to the essence as "form," but 
only loosely. 16 As we have seen, form, as principle of actuality in an 
individual thing, is individual; we can speak of Socrates and Plato 
having "the same form," but their forms are only specifically the same-
the form of Socrates is something that exists17 and by which Socrates 
exists; the form of Plato is something that exists and by which Plato 
exists, and these are clearly distinct forms-one can exist while the 
other does not. Indeed, although I find this rarely emphasized, since 
forms are principles of actualization, which make actual individual 
beings to be, forms themselves have an aspect of particularity or 
individuality about them. 18 
In contrast to this, the essence, in its intelligibility, must not have in 
it anything that is individual and therefore unintelligible; as something 
common to many, determining species, it must abstract altogether 
16 Aquinas very carefully handles those passages in Aristotle's Metaphysics 
where form seems to be identified with essence; see Armand Maurer, "Form 
and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas," Mediaeval Studies 13 (1951): 
165-76. But Aristotle's position may not be as unambiguous as Maurer 
describes; Aristotle suggests composition in the essence of material things in 
Metaphysics IX, ch. 10 (1051b17). See Thomas Aquinas, In IX Metaph., lect. 11 
(§§1901-1903) and Cajetan's In De Ente et Essentia, §29. 
17 Of course, material forms exist not as quod est but as quo aliquid est-but then, 
so long as we keep in mind the analogical senses of being, it is not 
inappropriate to say that forms exist. 
18 Also perhaps relevant here is that, while forms are principles of actuality 
corresponding with matter as principles of potentiality, Aquinas conceives of 
essences as principles of potentiality, corresponding with being (esse) as a 
principle of actuality. 
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from particularity .19 Only then can it be understood and defined as 
something common to many. 
The non-particularity of the essence is why the individual qua in-
dividual does not have an essence, because the individual qua 
individual does not have a definition;20 or, if an individual does have an 
essence qua individual, that essence could not be defined.21 A definition 
is formulated and understood as something common-at least 
potentially common-to many. The individual qua individual can be 
sensed, but not understood, and so is not subject to definition. Given 
the non-particularity of the essence, it would seem that for Aquinas it is 
19 Famously, the nature absolutely considered also must abstract from 
universality. But, as Aquinas explains in his careful handling of the problem 
of universals in De Ente et Essentia, it is the fact that it is conceived absolutely, 
that is in abstraction from particularity, which makes it possible to speak of 
the nature in an individual mind-directing that mind to attend to the 
nature absolutely considered as one thing common to many-to acquire 
universality as an accident. 
20 De Ente et Essentia, ch. 2: "Haec autem materia in diffinitione hominis, in 
quantum est homo, non ponitur, sed poneretur in diffinitione Socratis, si 
Socrates diffinitionem haberet." 
21 Summa Contra Gentiles, IV. 65: "the essence of a singular [qua singular] is 
made up of signate matter and an individual form: thus the essence of 
Socrates [qua Socrates] is made up of this particular body and this particular 
soul, even as the essence of man in general is made up of soul and body, as 
stated in 7 Metaph. Wherefore, since the latter are included in the definition 
of man in general, so would the former be included in the definition of 
Socrates, if he could be defined." (Singularis autem essentia constituitur ex 
materia designata et forma individuata: sicut socratis essentia ex hoc 
corpore et hac anima, ut essentia hominis universalis ex anima et corpore, ut 
patet in VII Metaphysicae. Uncle, sicut haec cadunt in definitione hominis 
universalis, ita ilia caderent in definitione socratis si posset definiri.) Cf. De 
Veritate 2.7: "Intellectus autem cognoscens essentiam speciei, per earn 
comprehendit omnia per se accidentia speciei illius: quia, secundum 
philosophum, omnis demonstrationis, per quam accidentia propria de 
subiecto concluduntur, principium est quod quid est: uncle et cognita propria 
essentia alicuius singularis, cognoscerentur omnia accidentia singularis 
illius: quod intellectus noster non potest: quia de essentia singularis est 
materia signata, a qua intellectus noster abstrahit, et poneretur in eius 
definitione, si singulare definitionem haberet." 
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only in a very qualified sense that we can speak of an essence of an 
individual qua individual.22 
The non-particularity of the essence is also why we speak of it being 
in need of a principle of individuation.23 The general Aristotelian pos-
ition is clear, that the essence is individuated by matter. But there are 
difficulties with this position. First, the essence can't be individuated by 
prime matter, which is not actually anything on its own. Second, there 
also has to be a sense in which matter is included in the essence, since 
it is part of the nature of material beings to be material beings. So the 
matter that individuates can neither be prime matter, nor can it be the 
formal materiality already included in substantial form. 
Here Aquinas's solution is well-known, and has already been 
mentioned: the essence is individuated by designated matter. Designated 
matter is matter with the first grade of actuality that marks it out as 
some particular bit of matter and not some other. As noted, Aquinas 
recognizes designated matter also to distinguish it from undesignated 
matter or common matter, the matter included in the essence. But 
what does it mean that non-designated matter is included in the 
essence? It is not obviously clear.24 The form of a material being is 
22 We should distinguish two things that could be meant by "individual 
essence": one, the common nature as it has being in an individual {we could 
call this "the individualized essence"); the other, the particular essence of an 
individual qua individual {we could call this "the singular essence"). [For one 
account of individual essences, see Hochschild, "Kenny and Aquinas on 
Individual Essences."] 
23 As far as I can tell, Aquinas does not address the problem of individuation as 
a problem for forms, but as a problem for common natures or essences. On the 
different kinds of questions which "a principle of individuation" might serve 
to answer, see Peter King, "The Problem of Individuation in the Middle 
Ages," Theoria 66 (2000): 159-84. [Also available online here: http:// 
individual.utoronto.ca/pking/ articles/Mediaeval_Individuation.pdf.] See 
also Georgio Pini, "Scotus on Individuation," Proceedings of the Society for 
Medieval Logic and Metaphysics 5 (2005): 50-69. 
24 Maurer seems to suggest that prime matter is also included in the essence: the 
composite includes prime matter, and so, "Although unintelligible in itself, 
prime matter is thus essential to the full intelligibility of the composite and 
enters in full right into the essence of a material being" {Maurer, "Form and 
Essence," 175). 
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called a material form, not in the sense that it is made up of matter, but 
in the sense that for it to be is for it to be in, or to actualize, matter. But 
then, as we saw previously, it seems as if materiality is already included 
in the very nature of such forms; why then, when it comes to 
describing the essence, do we have to say that it doesn't include "only" 
form but "also" matter? How does the essence differ from the 
substantial form? 
I think we can make sense of this if we recall that the designated 
matter is matter with the first grade of material actuality. What 
communicates this first grade of actuality to the designated matter that 
individuates the essence must be the substantial form. The essence, 
therefore, which is individuated by designated matter, cannot be the 
same as the substantial form which actualizes designated matter. 
In fact, it is Aquinas's clear and considered position that there is a 
real distinction between the essence and the substantial form. For 
reasons that remain somewhat obscure, Aquinas consistently expresses 
this as the distinction between the forma totius and forma partis, 
attributing the distinction to Avicenna (and occasionally opposing it to 
the doctrine of Averroes).25 The terminology is confusing, inviting 
explanations that themselves are not always clear.26 The literal 
25 E.g. In IV Sent., d. 44, a. lb ad 2; Quodlib. Quest., II, q. 2, a. 2; SCG IV.81; In VII 
Metaph., lect. 9 (§§1467-69). 
26 E.g. Peter King, "The Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages": "Aquinas 
distinguishes two kinds of forms: those including matter in their definition, 
and those not. The form 'humanity' includes matter in its definition, since it 
is rational animality; since animals are physical objects, matter must be 
involved in some fashion. On the other hand, the forms of immaterial objects 
clearly do not involve matter; more exactly, certain forms need not be 
enmattered to exist. Now forms occurring in material objects can be viewed 
either as the form of the whole object (forma totius), in which case the form is 
the complement to the matter of the object, or as the form of part of the 
object (forma partis), specifying only the formal principle of the object, in 
which case the form is the complement of the material principle" [English 
italics added]. I am not sure what difference King means to indicate between 
the matter and the material principle. Jorge J.E. Gracia's "Towards a 
Metaphysics of Existence" (in The Classics of Western Philosophy: A Reader's 
Guide, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia, Gregory M. Reichberg, and Bernard N. 
Schumacher [Blackwell, 2003], 137-42) says: "In one sense, 'an essence' 
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translations-form of the whole and form of the part-are only partly 
illuminating. The form of the whole is the form of the whole composite-
but not including designated matter; so it is the form of the whole of 
what something is. The form of the part is the form of one part of the 
composite-the part left over being prime matter. 
To complicate matters, Aquinas says that the forma totius (essence or 
quiddity) can itself be referred to according to different modes of 
signification: as a whole (by the concrete term, e.g. "man") or as a part 
(by the abstract counterpart term, e.g. "humanity"). In the first case, it 
can be predicated of that whole individual (qua member of a species); 
in the second case, it can only be predicated of that principle by which 
the individual is made a member of the species, but not of the in-
dividual itself. 
means everything that is expressed in the definition of the substance in 
question; this is why it can be predicated of the individuals who have such an 
essence. Accordingly, the essence of man embraces everything that is part of 
the definition of man, including materiality. In another sense, however, 'an 
essence' means just the form that, united to matter, constitutes the 
individual substance. Accordingly, the essence of this man, for example, 
refers only to the form of this man, which joined to this matter constitutes 
the individual man. Aquinas calls the first forma totius-generally translated 
as 'form of the whole,' but better expressed as 'the whole form' -and the 
second forma partis-again generally translated as 'the form of the part,' but 
better expressed as 'the form that is a part.' The status of the second is quite 
clear, for it is the individual essence of an individual being (ens)" (140). I do 
not find Aquinas treating the forma partis or substantial form as the 
"individual essence." Also, consider Gyula Klima, in "Man= Body+ Soul": "if 
we distinguish corporeity as that substantial form on account of which 
whatever has it exists in a material, spatio-temporal manner, whether the 
thing in question is alive or not, then the corporeity thus distinguished will 
clearly coincide in all living bodies with their soul, conceived as that 
substantial form on account of which whatever has this form is alive, 
whether it is a body or not. Therefore, in this non-exclusive sense, both the 
corporeity thus conceived and the soul thus conceived are nothing but the 
form of the whole, that is, the essence or quiddity of a living body." But if 
soul or substantial form are the forma totius, how does Klima account for the 
real distinction between the essence (forma totius) and the substantial form 
(forma partis), which he acknowledges earlier in the paper? 
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So, when we name the essence (i.e. with the abstract term, such as 
"humanity") we signify the form of a whole (i.e. the whole essence) as a 
part (i.e. as a part of the whole individual being). When we signify the 
essence in naming a member of the species (i.e. with the concrete term, 
such as "man") we signify the form of the whole (the whole essence) as 
a whole (i.e. as designating the whole composite individual). 
Aquinas, of course, says that the essence differs from the form 
because it includes, in addition to form, also matter. On my account, 
however, it seems that in a sense the substantial form "includes" more 
than the essence-it implies being (actually), and it implies particul-
arity, communicating even the first grade of actuality to prime matter 
(pure potentiality) to make the individual actual not only as the kind of 
thing it is but as the particular thing that it is. (I think this is why 
Aquinas makes the survival of the soul the basis for the survival of the 
whole individual in the resurrection: SCG IV. 81.) On this account, what 
is included in the individual's essence that is not included, or is 
obscured, in the substantial form is not matter but intelligibility. 
V. CONCLUSION 
These reflections lead to the following account of how the 
substantial form, soul, and essence differ when considered as 
components of an individual living material substance, united re-
spectively with prime matter, body, and designated matter. The 
individual's soul is the grade of actuality of the individual's life. The 
individual's essence is every grade of actuality of the individual 
excluding its particularity. And the individual's substantial form is the 
whole range of the individual's actuality, including not only what 
places it in a species but what makes it that particular individual. 
